Abstract-Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that performs digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously, at a lower computational costs and communication overheads than the signature-then-encryption approach. Recently, two identity-based threshold signcryption schemes [12] , [27] have been proposed by combining the concepts of identitybased threshold signature and signcryption together. However, the formal models and security proofs for both schemes are not considered. In this paper, we formalize the concept of identitybased threshold signcryption and give a new scheme based on the bilinear pairings. We prove its confidentiality under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and its unforgeability under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Our scheme turns out to be more efficient than the two previously proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [30] . The distinguishing property of ID-based cryptography is that a user's public key can be any binary string, such as an email address that can identify the user. This removes the need for senders to look up the recipient's public key before sending out an encrypted message. IDbased cryptography is supposed to provide a more convenient alternative to conventional public key infrastructure. Several practical ID-based signature schemes have been devised since 1984 [13] , [15] but a satisfying ID-based encryption scheme only appeared in 2001 [6] . It was devised by Boneh and Franklin and cleverly uses bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pairing) over supersingular elliptic curves.
Group-oriented cryptography was introduced by Desmedt in 1987 [10] . Elaborating on this concept, Desmedt and Frankel [11] proposed a (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the RSA system [28] . In such a (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any t out of n signers in the group can collaboratively sign messages on behalf of the group for sharing the signing capability. The first ID-based threshold signature scheme was proposed by Baek and Zheng in 2004 [3] .
Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important requirements for many cryptographic applications. A traditional approach to achieve these requirements is to sign-then-encrypt the message. Signcryption, first proposed by Zheng in 1997 [34] , is a cryptographic primitive that performs digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously, at lower computational costs and communication overheads than the signature-then-encryption approach. Following [34] , various signcryption schemes have been proposed, for instance, signcryption schemes in certificate-based public key setting [26] , [4] , [31] , [14] , [29] , [35] , [24] , [21] , [32] , [25] and signcryption schemes in ID-based public key setting [23] , [20] , [9] , [7] , [5] , [17] , [33] , [16] . The original scheme in [34] is based on the discrete logarithm problem but no security proof is given. Zheng's original construction [34] was only proven secure in 2002 by Baek et al. [2] who described a formal security model in a multi-user setting.
In 2004, Duan et al. [12] proposed an ID-based threshold signcryption scheme by combining the concepts of ID-based threshold signature and signcryption together. However, in Duan et al.'s scheme [12] , the master-key of the PKG is distributed to a number of other PKGs, which creates a bottleneck on the PKGs. In 2005, Peng and Li [27] proposed an ID-based threshold signcryption scheme based on Libert and Quisquater's ID-based signcryption scheme [20] . However, Peng and Li' scheme [27] does not provide the forward security. That is, anyone who obtains the sender's private key can recover the original message of a signcrypted text. In addition, both Duan et al.'s scheme [12] and Peng and Li's scheme [27] do not consider the formal models and security proofs. Ma et al. [22] also proposed a threshold signcryption scheme using the bilinear pairings. However, Ma et al.'s scheme [22] is not ID-based. Therefore, an interesting question is to find a provably secure ID-based threshold signcryption scheme. The aim of this paper is to answer this question.
In this paper, we present a formal security model for identity-based threshold signcryption and give a new scheme based on the bilinear pairings. We prove its confidentiality under the DBDH assumption and its unforgeability under the CDH assumption in the random oracle model. As compared with two previously proposed schemes (Duan et al.'s scheme [12] and Peng and Li's scheme [27] ), our scheme is more efficient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some preliminary works are given in Section II. The formal model of IDbased threshold signcryption is described in Section III. The proposed ID-based threshold signcryption scheme is given in Section IV. We analyze the proposed scheme in Section V.
Finally, the conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe the basic definition and properties of the bilinear pairings.
Let G I be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e:G I x G I -----+ G 2 with the following properties: 1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) == e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q E G I , a, b E Zq.
2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P and Q E G I such that e(P, Q) -I 1.
3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P,Q E G I .
The modified Weil pairing and the Tate pairing [6] are admissible maps of this kind. The security of our scheme described here relies on the hardness of the following problems. 
Definition 2: Given two groups G I and G2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear map e : G I x G I -----+ G 2 and a generator P of G I, the Computational Bilinear DiffieHellman problem (CBDHP) in (G I , G 2 , e) is to compute h == e(P, p)abc given (P, aP, bP, cP).
The decisional problem is of course not harder than the cOlnputational one. However, no algorithm is known to be able to solve any of them so far.
III. FORMAL MODEL OF ID-BASED THRESHOLD SIGNCRYPTION

A. Generic Scheme
A generic ID-based threshold signcryption scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, the private key generator (PKG) generates the system's public parameters params. Among the parameters produced by Setup is a key P pub that is made public. There is also corresponding master key s that is kept secret.
• Extract: Given an identity I D, the PKG computes the corresponding private key 51D and transmits it to its owner in a secure way.
• Keydis: Given a private key 51D associated with an identity I D, the number of signcryption members nand a threshold parameter t, this algorithm generates n shares of 51D and provides each one to the signcryption members All, . 
B. Security Notions
Malone-Lee [23] defines the security notions for ID-based signcryption schemes. These notions are indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks. We modify their definitions slightly to adapt for our ID-based threshold signcryption scheme. In addition, an ID-based threshold signcryption scheme should have the robustness.
Definition 3 (Confidentiality): An ID-based threshold signcryption scheme (IDTSC) is said to have the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks property (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1) The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters to the adversary A.
2) A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answer to the previous queries).
• Key extraction queries: A chooses an identity I D. Notice that the adversary is allowed to make a key extraction query on identity IDA in the above definition. This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of insider security for confidentiality of signcryption [1]. On the other hand, it ensures the forward security of the scheme, i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the sender's private key becomes compromised.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability): An ID-based threshold signcryption scheme (IDTSC) is said to have the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks (EUF-IDTSC-CMA) if no polynonlially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1) The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters to A. 2) A corrupts t -1 members in the sender group.
3) A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answer to the previous queries).
• Key extraction queries: A chooses an identity I D.
C computes SID == Extract(ID) and sends SID to A.
• Private keys queries to the corrupted members: • Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q (with G I additive and G 2 multiplicative), a generator P of G I , a bilin- • Extract: Given an identity I D, the PKG computes QID == HI(ID) and the private key SID == SQID. Then PKG sends the private key to its owner in a secure way.
• Keydis: Suppose that a threshold t and n satisfy 1 :::; t :::; n < q. To share the private key SIDA among the group UA, the trusted dealer performs the steps below. 1) Choose F I , ... ,F t -1 uniformly at random from Gi,
Broadcast Yo == e(SIDA' P) and Yj == e(Fj , P) for j == 1, ... , t -1. 
where T e denotes the computation time of the bilinear map.
Proof' Please see full paper [19] . Baek and Zheng [3] defined the simulatability of ID-based threshold signature and proved the relationship between the security of ID-based threshold signature and that of ID-based signature. From these results, we can obtain the following Theorem 3.
Definition 6 ([3J): An ID-based threshold signature scheme is said to be simulatable if the following conditions hold.
1) The private key distribution is simulatable: given the system parameters params and the identity I D, there exists a simulator which can simulate the view of the adversary on an execution of private key distribution.
2) The threshold signature generation is simulatable: given the system parameters params, the identity I D, the message m, the corresponding signature (R 1 , W), t-1 shares of the private key that matches to I D of the corrupted members, and the corresponding verification keys, there is a simulator which can simulate the view of the adversary on an execution of threshold signature generation. Theorem 2 ([3J): If an ID-based threshold signature scheme is simulatable and the ID-based signature scheme which is associated with the ID-based threshold signature scheme is secure in the sense of unforgeability, then the ID-based threshold signature scheme is also secure in the sense of unforgeability.
Theorem 3 (Unforgeability): The proposed ID-based threshold signcryption scheme is secure in the sense of unforgeability.
Proof' Please see full paper [19] .
[J
Theorem 4 (Robustness):
The proposed ID-based threshold signcryption sch-eme is robust against an adversary which is allowed to corrupt any t -1 members, where n ?:: 2t -1.
B. Efficiency
We compare the major computational costs and communication overheads (the length of the ciphertext) of our scheme with those of Duan et al.'s ID-based threshold signcryption scheme [12] and Peng and Li's ID-based threshold signcryption scheme [27] in Figure 1 . We consider the costly operations which include point scalar multiplications in G 1 (G 1 Mul), exponentiations in G 2 (G 2 Exp), and pairing operations (Pairing). From Figure 1 , we can see that both Duan et aI.'s scheme and Peng and Li's scheme need 3t + 4 pairing computations and our scheme only needs 2t+4 pairing computations. Since the pairing computation is the most time consuming, the proposed scheme is more efficient than Duan et aI.'s scheme and Peng and Li's scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an efficient and provably secure ID-based threshold signcryption scheme based on the bilinear pairings. We proved that our scheme satisfies the confidentiality, the unforgeability, and the robustness. As compared with two previously proposed schemes (Duan et al.'s scheme [12] and Peng and Li's scheme [27] 
